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This paper examines the robustness characteristics of optimal control policies derived under 
the assumption of rational expectations to alternative models of expectations. We assume 
that agents have imperfect knowledge about the precise structure of the economy and form 
expectations using a forecasting model that they continuously update based on incoming 
data. We find that the optimal control policy derived under the assumption of rational 
expectations can perform poorly when expectations deviate modestly from rational 
expectations. We then show that the optimal control policy can be made more robust by 
deemphasizing the stabilization of real economic activity and interest rates relative to 
inflation in the central bank loss function. That is, robustness to learning provides an 
incentive to employ a "conservative" central banker. We then examine two types of simple 
monetary policy rules from the literature that have been found to be robust to model 
misspecification in other contexts. We find that these policies are robust to empirically 
plausible parameterizations of the learning models and perform about as well or better than 
optimal control policies. 
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For nearly as long as macroeconomic models have existed, economists have been drawn
to the idea of applying optimal control theory to the problem of monetary policy (see
Chow, 1976, for an early example). Support for the use of optimal control for policy has
waxed and waned, re°ecting in part swings in economists' con¯dence in macroeconometric
models. Recently, interest among academics and at central banks has re-emerged, as spelled
out in contributions by Svensson (2002), Svensson and Woodford (2003), Woodford (2003),
Giannoni and Woodford (2005), and others. As described in Svensson and Tetlow (2005),
analytical and computational advances now make it possible to operationalize this approach
using the Federal Reserve Board's large-scale nonlinear macroeconomic model and other
models.
One potential shortcoming of the optimal control approach is that it ignores uncertainty
about the speci¯cation of the model. Although in principle one could incorporate various
types of uncertainty to the analysis of optimal policy, in practice this is infeasible given
current methods and computational power. As a result, existing optimal control policy
analysis is done using a single reference model. Levin and Williams (2003) found that
optimal control policies can perform very poorly if the central bank's reference model is
badly misspeci¯ed. Given the prominence accorded to optimal control in the monetary
policy literature and increasingly at central banks, it seems an especially propitious moment
to examine more closely the robustness properties of optimal control and other monetary
policies when the reference model may be misspeci¯ed.
In this paper, we study the robustness of optimal control policies derived under the
assumption of rational expectations to potential model misspeci¯cation with respect to
how private agents form expectations.1 The existing literature in this area, including Or-
phanides and Williams (2007a,b), has focused exclusively on simple monetary policy rules
1We follow the methodology advocated by McCallum (1988) and Taylor (1993) and implemented in
numerous papers, including Taylor (1999), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Orphanides and
Williams (2002, 2007a,b), and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007). An alternative approach, and one that
we view as complementary to ours, is robust control (Hansen and Sargent, 2007). These methods are best
suited to situations where deviations from the reference model are thought to be relatively modest.
1that are generalizations of the Taylor Rule (Taylor 1993) and has not analyzed optimal con-
trol policies. We take seriously the informational problems facing economic agents, which
may cause expectations to deviate from those implied by the model of the economy they
inhabit (see Taylor, 1975, for an early analysis of this issue and Sargent, 2007, for a recent
discussion). Evidence that survey measures of expectations are ine±cient and display sig-
ni¯cant disagreement at each point in time (see, for example, Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers,
2004, Williams, 2004, and D'Amico and Orphanides, 2006) suggests that that the process
of expectations formation is an important source of model uncertainty. As an alternative
to rational expectations, we assume that agents learn about the economy by reestimating
a forecasting model as new data become available. We consider a range of learning models,
each of which yields good forecasts in our model economy and represents a relatively modest
departure from the rational expectations benchmark.
We ¯nd that the optimal control policy derived assuming rational expectations can
perform poorly in our estimated model of the U.S. economy when agents do not possess
perfect knowledge of the economy but instead must learn. To evaluate the optimal policy,
we assume the central bank aims to minimize the weighted unconditional variances of the
deviation of the in°ation rate from its target, the deviation of the unemployment rate from
the natural rate, and the ¯rst di®erence of the nominal interest rate. The optimal control
policy brings in°ation gradually back to target while smoothing swings in the unemployment
rate and interest rate. This policy works extremely well when private expectations are
perfectly aligned with those implied by rational expectations; however, if agents are learning,
expectations can deviate from those implied by rational expectations, and the ¯nely-tuned
optimal control policy can go awry. In particular, by implicitly assuming that in°ation
expectations are always well anchored, the optimal control policy responds insu±ciently
strongly to movements in in°ation, which results in highly persistent and large deviations
of the in°ation rate from its target.
We show that the lack of robustness of the optimal policy derived under rational ex-
pectations can be corrected by assigning the central bank a policy objective that places
2signi¯cantly less weight on stabilization of the real economy and interest rates relative to
in°ation than that implied by society's true objective function. Thus, robustness to learn-
ing provides a rationale for hiring a \conservative" central banker in the parlance of Rogo®
(1985). We ¯nd that the optimal bias to the weights in the loss function are quite large,
implying that the central bank should act as if it put up to ten times greater weight on
in°ation than implied by society's true loss function. The optimal control policy derived
under the biased objective function responds more strongly to in°ation, anchoring in°ation
expectations and performing well under the models of learning that we consider.
We then compare the performance of the optimal control policy to two types of sim-
ple monetary policy rules that have been found to be robust to model uncertainty in the
literature. The ¯rst is a forward-looking version of a Taylor-type rule, which Levin, et al
(2003) found to perform very well in a number of estimated rational expectations models.
The second is a rule proposed by Orphanides and Williams (2007a) that di®ers from the
¯rst rule in that policy responds to the change in the measure of economic activity, rather
than to the level. This type of rule has been shown to perform very well in a counterfactual
analysis of monetary policy during 1996{2003 undertaken by Tetlow (2006). Both rules are
parsimonious in that they have only two free parameters. We ¯nd that these two simple
monetary policy rules, where the parameters are chosen to be optimal under rational ex-
pectations, perform very well under learning. Indeed, these rules outperform the optimal
control policies derived under rational expectations with the society's true loss when agents
learn, and yield comparable performance to the optimal control policy derived under the
biased objective function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and reports the estimation results. Section 3 describes the central bank objective and
optimal control policy. Section 4 describes the models of expectations formation. Section
5 discusses the simulation methods. Section 6 reports and analyzes economic outcomes for
optimal control policies under rational expectations and under learning. Section 7 examines
the performance of simple monetary policy rules, and section 8 concludes.
32 An Estimated Model of the U.S. Economy
Our analysis uses a simple quarterly model motivated by the recent literature on micro-
founded models incorporating some inertia in in°ation and output (see Woodford, 2003, for
a fuller discussion). The speci¯cation of the model is closely related to that in Giannoni
and Woodford (2005), Smets (2003), and others. The main di®erence is that we substitute
the unemployment gap for the output gap to facilitate the estimation of the model using
real-time data. The two concepts are closely related in practice by Okun's law, and the key
properties of the model are largely una®ected by this choice.
2.1 The Model
The structural model consists of two equations that describe the behavior of the unemploy-
ment rate and the in°ation rate and equations describing the time series properties of the
exogenous shocks. To close the model, the short-term interest rate is set by the central
bank, as described in the next section.
The \IS curve" equation is motivated by the Euler equation for consumption with ad-
justment costs or habit:
ut = Áuue
t+1 + (1 ¡ Áu)ut¡1 + ®u (ie
t ¡ ¼e
t+1 ¡ r¤) + vt; (1)
vt = ½vvt¡1 + ev;t; ev » N(0;¾2
ev): (2)
This equation relates the unemployment rate, ut, to the unemployment rate expected in the
next period, one lag of the unemployment rate, and the di®erence between the expected ex
ante real interest rate, re
t|equal to the di®erence between the nominal short-term interest
rate, it, and the expected in°ation rate in the following period, ¼t+1|and the natural rate
of interest, r¤. The unemployment rate is subject to a shock, vt, that is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process with innovation variance ¾2
ev. The AR(1) speci¯cation for the shocks is
based on the evidence of serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated unemployment
equation, as discussed below.
The \Phillips curve" equation is motivated by the New Keynesian Phillips curve with
4indexation:
¼t = Á¼¼e
t+1 + (1 ¡ Á¼)¼t¡1 + ®¼(ut ¡ u¤
t) + e¼;t; e¼ » N(0;¾2
e¼): (3)
It relates in°ation, ¼t, (measured as the annualized percent change in the GNP or GDP
price index, depending on the period) during quarter t to lagged in°ation, expected future
in°ation, denoted by ¼e
t+1, and the di®erence between the unemployment rate, ut, and
and the natural rate of unemployment, u¤
t, during the current quarter. The parameter
Á¼ measures the importance of expected in°ation on the determination of in°ation, while
(1¡Á¼) captures the e®ects of in°ation indexation. The \mark up" shock, e¼;t, is assumed
to be a white noise disturbance with variance ¾2
e¼.
In the model simulations, we abstract from time variation in the natural rates of interest
and unemployment and assume for convenience that these are constant. We further assume
that they are known by the central bank. (See Orphanides and Williams, 2007a and 2007b,
for analysis of time-varying natural rates in a model with learning.)
2.2 Model Estimation and Calibration
We estimate the IS curve and Phillips curve equations using forecasts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) as proxies for the expectations that appear in the equations.2
We assume that expectations are formed in the previous quarter; that is, we assume that the
expectations a®ecting in°ation and unemployment in period t are those collected in quarter
t¡1. This matches the informational structure in many theoretical models (see Woodford,
2003, and Giannoni and Woodford, 2005). To match the in°ation and unemployment
data as best as possible with these forecasts, we use ¯rst announced estimates of these
series, obtained from the Real-Time Dataset for Macroeconomists maintained by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In estimating the in°ation equation, we use the Congressional
Budget O±ce (2001) estimates of the natural rate of unemployment as proxies for the true
2Speci¯cally, we use the mean forecasts of the unemployment rate and the three-month Treasury bill
rate. We construct in°ation forecasts using the annualized log di®erence of the GNP or GDP price de°ator,
which we construct from the reported forecasts of real and nominal GNP or GDP. The Survey is currently
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. See Croushore (1993) and Croushore and Stark
(2001) for details on the survey methodology.
5values. The data sample used in estimation of the model runs from 1968:4 to 2004:2, where
the starting date is the ¯rst sample point in the SPF.3
Estimation results are reported below, with standard errors indicated in parentheses.
We estimate the IS curve equation using least squares with AR(1) residuals. Unrestricted
estimation of the IS curve equation yields a point estimate for Áu of 0.39, with a standard
error of 0.15. This estimate is below the lower bound of 0.5 implied by theory; however, the
null hypothesis of a value of 0.5 is not rejected by the data.4 We therefore impose Áu = 0:5
in estimating the remaining parameters of the equation. Note that the estimated equation
also includes a constant term (not shown) that provides an estimate of the natural real
interest rate, which we assume to be constant:
ut = 0:5ue
t+1 + 0:5ut¡1 +0:056
(0:022)
(re
t ¡ r¤) + vt; (4)
vt = 0:513
(0:085)
vt¡1 + ev;t; ^ ¾ev = 0:30; (5)
¼t = 0:5¼e




t) + e¼;t; ^ ¾e¼ = 1:35; (6)
Unrestricted estimation of the Phillips curve equation yields a point estimate for Á¼
of 0.51, just barely above the lower bound implied by theory.5 For symmetry with our
treatment of the IS curve, we impose Á¼ = 0:5 and estimate the remaining parameters
using OLS. The estimated residuals for this equation show no signs of serial correlation in
the price equation (DW = 2.09), consistent with the assumption of the model.
3 Optimal Control Monetary Policy
We assume that the monetary policy instrument is the nominal short-term interest rate
and that the central bank's objective is to minimize a loss equal to the weighted sum of the
3Expectations for the Treasury bill rate were not collected in the ¯rst few years of the sample. When
these are not available, we use the expectations of the three-month rate implied by the slope of the term
structure under the expectations hypothesis.
4This ¯nding is consistent with the results reported in Giannoni and Woodford (2005), who in a similar
model, ¯nd that the corresponding coe±cient is constrained to be at its theoretical lower bound.
5For comparison, Giannoni and Woodford (2005) ¯nd that the corresponding coe±cient is constrained
to be at its theoretical lower bound of 0.5.
6unconditional variances of the in°ation rate, the unemployment gap, and the change in the
nominal federal funds rate. Speci¯cally,
L = V ar(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + ¸V ar(u ¡ u¤) + ºV ar(¢(i)): (7)
where V ar(x) denotes the unconditional variance of variable x. We assume an in°ation
target of zero percent. As a benchmark for our analysis, we assume ¸ = 4 and º = 1. Based
on an Okun's gap type relationship, the variance of the unemployment gap is about 1/4
that of the output gap, so this choice of ¸ corresponds to equal weights on in°ation and
output gap variability. We also examine alternative parameterizations of the loss function.
In setting policy in every period, we assume that the central bank observes all variables
from all previous periods, including private sector forecasts, when making the current period
policy decision. We further assume that the central bank has access to a commitment
technology; that is, we study policy under commitment.
The optimal control policy is the policy that minimizes the loss subject to the constraints
imposed by the equations describing the economy. This policy is constructed, as is standard
in the literature, assuming that the policymaker knows the true parameters of the structural
model and that all agents use rational expectations. Note that for the optimal control
policy, as well as for the simple policy rules described below, we use lagged information
in the determination of the interest rate, re°ecting the lag in data releases. In principle,
the optimal control policy is described by a set of equations that describe the ¯rst-order
optimality condition for policy and the behavior of the Lagrange multipliers associated
with the constraints on the optimization problem implied by the structural equations of the
model economy.
Because we are interested in describing the setting of policy in a potentially misspeci¯ed
model, it is useful to represent the optimal control policy with an equation that relates the
policy instrument to observable variables, rather than in terms of Lagrange multipliers
that depend on the model. There are in¯nitely many such representations, some of which
do not yield a determinate rational expectations equilibrium. We consider two alternative
representations, each of which yields a unique determinate rational expectations equilibrium
7that very closely mimics that under the fully optimal policy.
In the ¯rst representation, which we denote \OC," the optimal control policy is ap-
proximated by a feedback rule where the setting of policy depends on the observed past
values of in°ation, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate. In our model, the fully
optimal policy can be nearly perfectly approximated by an equation where the interest rate
is determined by three lags of the interest rate, in°ation rate, and the unemployment rate.
For the benchmark parameterization of the weights in the loss function, the resulting OC
policy is given by:
it = 1:17it¡1 + 0:03it¡2 ¡ 0:28it¡3+ (8)
0:17¼t¡1 + 0:03¼t¡2 + 0:01¼t¡3 ¡ 2:47ut¡1 + 2:12ut¡2 ¡ 0:32ut¡3:
The second representation of the optimal control policy is a form of a forecast-targeting
policy similar to that proposed by Svensson and Woodford (2003) and we denote it \OC-
FT." In principle, this form of the optimal control policy requires including in¯nitely many
leads of the objective variables. However, Giannoni and Woodford (2005) show that this
policy can be approximated well by including only a few leads of the target variables. We
¯nd that a speci¯cation in which the policy instrument depends on the ¯rst three leads of
the in°ation rate and the unemployment rate and three lags of the policy instrument yields
outcomes under rational expectations nearly identical to those under the optimal control
policy. Abstracting from the constant, the OC-FT policy is given by:








In implementing this policy, we assume that the central bank uses the forecasts consis-
tent with reduced form of the structural under the assumption of rational expectations, as
explained below.
84 Expectations Formation
Because we are interested in the robustness of monetary policies to uncertainty about how
expectations are formed, we consider several di®erent models of expectations formation.
One model is rational expectations, where private agents are assumed to know with certainty
all features of the estimated model. We assume that the model with rational expectations is
the central bank's reference model, that is, the model it uses to compute optimal monetary
policies. In the remaining models that we study, agents are assumed to engage in real-time
perpetual learning. The models di®er in the particular perceived laws of motion (PLM) of
the economy that agents assume for their forecasting model.
4.1 Perpetual Learning
In the models of learning that we consider, we assume that private agents and, in some cases,
the central bank, form expectations using an estimated reduced-form forecasting model.
Speci¯cally, following Orphanides and Williams (2005), we posit that private agents engage
in perpetual learning, that is, they reestimate their forecasting model using a constant-
gain least squares algorithm that weights recent data more heavily than past data.6 This
approach to modeling learning allows for the possible presence of time variation in the
economy. It also implies that agents' estimates are always subject to sampling variation,
that is, the estimates do not eventually converge to ¯xed values.
We assume that agents forecast in°ation, the unemployment rate, and the short-term
interest rate using an unrestricted vector autoregression model (VAR) containing lags of
these three variables and a constant. VAR models are well-suited for our purposes. First,
variants of VARs are commonly used by macroeconomic forecasters, making this a reason-
able choice on realism grounds. Second, the rational expectations equilibrium of our model
implies a reduced-form VAR of this form.
We consider three alternative speci¯cations of the VAR used for forecasting, with lag
lengths of one, two, and three quarters. The VAR with three lags nests the reduced form
6See also Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2001), and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for related
treatments of learning.
9of the model under the assumptions of rational expectations. In particular, under this as-
sumption, the minimum state space reduced-form of the equilibrium implied by the Phillips
and IS curves includes two lags each of the in°ation rate and interest rate and three lags
of the unemployment rate. The monetary policy rule may imply additional states for the
economy, depending on the speci¯cation of the rule. For the rules that we consider, the
three-lag VAR nests the reduced form of the rational expectations equilibrium. We also
consider VARs with shorter lag lengths to capture the possibility that agents do not know
the true reduced-form structure of the economy. In addition, we know from the forecasting
literature that parsimonious VARs can perform better at forecasting in small samples, so
agents may optimally choose under-parameterized VARs to improve forecast accuracy.
At the end of each period, agents update their estimates of their forecasting model using
data through the current period. To ¯x notation, let Yt denote the 1 £ 3 vector consisting
of the in°ation rate, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate, each measured at time
t: Yt = (¼t;ut;it). For a VAR with l lags, let Xt be the (3¢l +1)£1 vector of regressors in
the forecast model: Xt = (1;¼t¡1;ut¡1;it¡1;:::;¼t¡l;ut¡l;it¡l). Let ct be the (3¢l +1)£3
vector of coe±cients of the forecasting model. Using data through period t, the coe±cients
of the forecasting model can be written in recursive form:
ct = ct¡1 + ·R¡1
t Xt(Yt ¡ X0
tct¡1); (10)
Rt = Rt¡1 + ·(XtX0
t ¡ Rt¡1); (11)
where · is the gain. With these estimates in hand, agents construct multi-period forecasts
needed for their decisions.
For some speci¯cations of the VAR, Rt may not be full rank. For example, if policy
follows a policy rule where the nominal interest rate depends on the ¯rst lag of the in°ation
and unemployment rates and agents form expectations using a VAR(3), then Rt will be
less than full rank under rational expectations. To avoid this problem, in each period of
the model simulations, we check the rank of Rt. If it is less than full rank, we assume that
agents apply a standard Ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970, where Rt is replaced
by Rt + 0:00001 ¤ I(k), and k is the dimension of R.
104.2 Calibrating the Learning Rate
A key parameter in the learning model is the private-agent updating parameter, ·. Es-
timates of this parameter tend to be imprecise and sensitive to model speci¯cation, but
tend to lie between 0 and 0.04.7 We take 0.02 to be a reasonable benchmark value for ·, a
value implying that the mean age of the weighted sample is about the same as for standard
least squares with a sample of 25 years. Given the uncertainty about this parameter, we
report results for values of · between 0.01 (equivalent in mean sample age to a sample of
about 50 years) to 0.03 (equivalent in mean sample age to a sample of about 16 years). For
comparison, we also report results for the case of · = 0; in this case, agents do not update
the coe±cients of the forecast model, and instead, the coe±cient values are ¯xed at the
initial values that are set as explained in the next section.
5 Simulation Method
In the case of rational expectations we compute model unconditional moments numerically
as described in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999). In all other cases, we compute
approximations of the unconditional moments using stochastic simulations of the model.
5.1 Stochastic Simulations
For the stochastic simulations, we initialize all model variables to their respective steady-
state values, which we assume to be zero. The initial conditions of C and R are set to
the steady-state values implied by the forecasting PLM in the absence of learning. Under
VAR(3) expectations, this is identical with the rational expectations equilibrium.
In each period, innovations are generated from independent Gaussian distributions with
variances reported above. The private agents' forecasting model is updated each period and
a new set of forecasts computed. We simulate the model for 44,000 periods and discard the
¯rst 4000 periods to eliminate the e®ects of initial conditions. We compute the unconditional
moments from the remaining 40,000 periods (10,000 years) of simulated data.
7See Sheridan (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Branch and Evans (2006), and Milani (2007).
115.2 The Projection Facility
Private agents' learning process injects a nonlinear structure into the model that may cause
it to display explosive behavior in a simulation. In simulations where the model is beginning
to display signs of explosive behavior, we follow Marcet and Sargent (1989) and stipulate
the existence of a \projection facility," that is, modi¯cations to the model that curtail the
explosive behavior.
One potential source of explosive behavior is that the forecasting model itself may be-
come explosive. We take the view that in practice private forecasters reject explosive models.
Correspondingly, in each period of the simulation, we compute the maximum root of the
forecasting VAR (excluding the constants). If this root falls below the critical value of 1, the
forecast model is updated as described above; if not, we assume that the forecast model is
not updated and the matrices C and R are held at their respective values from the previous
period.8 This constraint is typically encountered in less than 1 percent of the simulation
periods; however, in the case of a high updating rate (· = 0:03), this constraint can be
encountered up to 2 percent of the time.
This constraint on the forecasting model is insu±cient to assure that the model economy
does not exhibit explosive behavior in all simulations. For this reason, we impose a second
condition that eliminates explosive behavior. In particular, the in°ation rate, nominal
interest rate, and the unemployment gap are not allowed to exceed in absolute value six
times their respective unconditional standard deviations (computed under the assumption
of rational expectations) from their respective steady-state values. This constraint on the
model is invoked extremely rarely in the simulations.
6 Performance of the Optimal Control Policy
We ¯rst evaluate the performance of the OC and OC-FT policies in the model assuming
rational expectations. We then examine the performance when agents learn.
8We chose this critical value so that the test would have a small e®ect on model simulation behavior
while eliminating explosive behavior in the forecasting model.
126.1 Outcomes under Rational Expectations
The impulse responses to the two shocks are virtually indistinguishable for the OC and
OC-FT policies under rational expectations and the implied central bank losses are likewise
nearly identical. The dotted lines in Figure 1 show the impulse responses to in°ation and
unemployment shocks for the OC policy under rational expectations. The optimal policies
possess two key features. First, they generate noticeable secondary cycles associated with
a very high degree of policy inertia. Second, the response of the nominal interest rate to
the in°ation shock is very muted, with the interest rate rising only about 30 basis points
in response to a 1.3 percentage point shock to in°ation. Under rational expectations, this
gradual and relatively modest policy response is su±cient to bring in°ation under control
because the future course of policy is perfectly understood by the public. As we will see,
when these assumptions fail, this approach to policy can have unfortunate consequences.
6.2 Outcomes under Learning
We now turn to the performance of the di®erent policies when agents learn. We start by
evaluating the forecast performance of the various PLMs. We then evaluate the performance
of the optimal control policies.
6.2.1 Forecast Model Selection
Table 1 reports the root-mean-squared one-step-ahead forecast errors in the model simula-
tions under the OC policy for di®erent values of the learning parameters, ·, and the three
speci¯cations of the PLM. The ¯rst four rows show the results when the public forms ex-
pectations using the three-lag VAR, the second four rows show the results when the public
forecasts using a two-lag VAR, and the ¯nal four rows show the results when the public
uses a one-lag VAR.
Overall, for in°ation and unemployment forecasts, all three VARs do about equally well.
In fact, the under-parameterized VARs with one and two lags tend to do slightly better than
the three-lag VAR when agents are learning (· > 0). The interest rate forecasts are better
with the three-lag VAR, re°ecting the fact that the interest rate depends on variables not
13included in the one- and two-lag VARs.9
We now examine whether each forecast model is self-con¯rming, by which we mean that
agents residing in an economy where all other agents used model X for forecasting would
also choose model X to forecast. We do this by simulating the model assuming all agents
use a VAR with l lags and then compute the forecast errors of the alternative forecast
models. The o®-diagonal blocks in Table 1 report the results.
Under the OC policy, the VAR(3) is self-con¯rming in that the alternative forecasting
models yield equal or larger root-mean-squared (RMS) forecast errors than the VAR(3)
forecasts. That said, the forecasting performance for in°ation and unemployment in the
VAR(2) model is nearly indistinguishable from that in the VAR(3) model, suggesting that,
on average, agents would be close to indi®erent between the two models. Interestingly, the
VAR(2) model is close to self-con¯rming as well. That is, if all agents use the VAR(2) for
forecasting, forecasts of the unemployment rate and in°ation from the VAR(3) and VAR(1)
would be about as accurate as, or worse than, on average, those from the VAR(2). The
VAR(3) does slightly better at forecasting the interest rate. The VAR(1) does not appear
to be self-con¯rming. The other models do better at forecasting unemployment and the
interest rate and only slightly worse at forecasting in°ation when all agents use the VAR(1)
for forecasting.
In short, all three VAR models seem to be reasonable for forecasting; therefore, on
this basis it would be hard to dismiss any of them out of hand. Interest rate forecasts
are generally better in the VAR with three lags, but the forecasting accuracy of the other
variables often su®ers slightly in the VAR when agents are leaning.
6.2.2 Policy evaluation with learning
We now examine the performance of the two representations of the OC and OC-FT policies
computed under the assumption of rational expectations in an environment where agents
9The three-lag VAR encompasses the OC policy, so under that policy the interest rate forecasts errors
would be zero if it were not for the e®ects when the projection facility on excessive variability of interest
rates is invoked. We experimented with relaxing the restriction on the size of permissable interest rate
°uctuations. With this modi¯cation, the interest rate forecast errors were zero and the performance of the
rule was nearly the same as reported in the paper.
14are learning.
The behavior of the economy with learning under the OC policy for the case of the three-
lag VAR and · = 0:02 is seen in the impulse responses, shown in Figure 1. In the model with
learning, the impulse response to a shock depends on the initial conditions. We therefore
show the distribution of impulse response functions (IRF) taken over the unconditional
joint distribution of the c and R matrices and the endogenous variables in the model, as
described in Orphanides and Williams (2007a). Note that these are not con¯dence bands
per se, but only re°ect the e®ects of di®ering initial conditions on the response to a shock.
When agents learn, the OC policy does not e®ectively contain movements in in°ation.
Under rational expectations, the OC policy is characterized by a relatively modest rise in
interest rates, but still manages to engineer a reduction of in°ation through a period of
below-target in°ation starting about a year after the onset of the shock. However, with
learning, the range of responses of in°ation to both shocks is very large, indicating that this
policy is e®ective at containing in°ation only when agents' expectations formation is very
close to that implied by the rational expectations equilibrium.
Macroeconomic performance under the OC policy deteriorates with learning, with the
magnitude in °uctuations in all three objective variables increasing in the updating rate, ·.
Columns two through ¯ve of Table 2 report the results from these experiments. The upper
third of the table reports results where agents use a three-lag VAR in forming forecasts.
The ¯rst row in this third of the table reports the results where agents do not learn, but
instead hold ¯xed the coe±cients of their forecasting model. Because the three-lag VAR
nests the reduced-form of the rational expectations equilibrium, this case corresponds to
rational expectations.
The e®ects of learning under the OC policy are quite large. In the benchmark case of
· = 0:02, and when agents use a three-lag VAR for forecasting, the central bank loss is
twice as large as obtains absent learning. The main problem with the OC policy is that it is
designed to stabilize in°ation in a \perfect" world of rational expectations. Under learning,
the modest policy responses to outbreaks of in°ation or de°ation are insu±cient to keep
15in°ation and in°ation expectations under tight control, as discussed further below.
If agents use under-parameterized VARs for forecasting but do not learn, performance
is somewhat worse than under rational expectations. Evidently, in this model, the optimal
control policy works best if expectations are perfectly aligned with those implied by the
policy. Interestingly, with these VAR forecasting models, the deleterious e®ects of learning
are generally smaller in the case of the three-lag VAR. The parsimony of these forecasting
models may minimize random °uctuations in the VAR coe±cients that tend to plague
larger-scale VARs.
We now turn to the performance of the OC-FT policy with learning. With a forecast-
based representation of optimal policy, we need to specify how the central bank makes its
forecast that it uses in setting policy. Consistent with the assumption that the central bank
takes its structural model to be true, we posit that the central bank computes its forecast
using the structural model assuming that private agents do the same. Results are reported
in the ¯nal four columns of Table 2, where it can be seen that the outcomes are nearly the
same as for the OC policy. This ¯nding is not surprising. If the OC and OC-FT policies
yielded identical outcomes under rational expectations, then, because we assume that the
central bank uses the rational expectations equilibrium of the model to generate forecasts,
the outcomes would be identical regardless of how private agents form expectations. This
equivalence arises because the leads in the optimal policy equation can be replaced with
the forecasts implied by the reduced form of the rational expectations equilibrium. In our
approximation, however, the OC and OC-FT policies yield slightly di®erent equilibria under
rational expectations, so the outcomes under learning di®er as well.
6.3 Alternative Weights in the Loss Function
We now examine the sensitivity of our results to the values of the weights in the loss
function, ¸ and º. Table 3 reports the outcomes for OC policies derived under a selection
of alternative sets of loss function weights. For these computations we assume that private
agents use the VAR(3) for forecasting. As in the benchmark calibration of the loss, in all
cases reported here, the loss increases with the learning parameter ·.
16The deleterious e®ects of learning on stabilization performance under the OC policy
are smaller when the central bank loss puts less weight on unemployment and interest rate
variability in the loss. For example, in the case of the benchmark values of ¸ = 4 and º = 1,
the standard deviation of the in°ation rate is 0.9 percentage point higher for · = 0:02 than
for · = 0 (as seen in Table 2); but, if ¸ = 1, the corresponding increase in the standard
deviation of the in°ation rate is only 0.7 percentage point (as seen in Table 3). The e®ects of
learning on the variability of unemployment and the change in the interest rate are similar
for these two values of ¸. Likewise, if the weight on interest rate variability, º, is reduced,
the e®ects of learning on performance are smaller, as seen by comparing the outcomes for
º = 0:5 and º = 1 when ¸ = 1. The combination of large weights on both unemployment
and interest rate variability greatly magni¯es the e®ects of learning on macro performance
under the OC policy, as illustrated by the case of ¸ = 16 and º = 2 reported in the table.
OC policies optimized with relatively low weights on unemployment and interest rate
variability are characterized by larger responses to the in°ation rate, which promotes the
stabilization of in°ation and in°ation expectations when agents learn. When both of these
weights are relatively low, that is, the central bank places a high relative weight on in°ation
stabilization, the OC policy acts to return in°ation back to target very rapidly after a shock
and, as a result, the public's expectation of in°ation remains near the target and the e®ects
of learning on the economy are muted. In contrast, when the weights on unemployment
and interest rate variability are relatively high, the OC policy attempts to engineer very
gradual return of in°ation to target following a shock. The resulting persistent deviations
of in°ation from target can confuse the public, who have imperfect knowledge about the
economy and, in particular, the central bank's objective.
6.4 Biasing the Central Bank Loss Function
We now consider the problem of the design of optimal policy that acknowledges uncertainty
about how agents form expectations. One approach would be to compute the optimal control
policy in the model with learning. For example, Gaspar et al (2006) compute optimal
nonlinear policies in a very simple model. This approach has two serious shortcomings
17that make it of limited use in practice. First, it requires one to specify the \true" model of
learning, which we view as unrealistic. Second, deriving the optimal control policy in a real-
world empirical monetary model typically used by central banks remains computationally
prohibitive due to the nonlinear nature of models with learning.
We therefore consider the alternative approach of searching for a \biased" central bank
loss function such that the implied OC policy derived assuming rational expectations per-
forms well under learning for the true social loss function. This approach applies existing
methods of computing optimal policies under rational expectations and is therefore feasible
in practice. In particular, for a given value of ·, we searched for the values of ~ ¸ and ~ º such
that the OC policy derived used the loss ~ L = V ar(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + ~ ¸V ar(u ¡ u¤) + ~ ºV ar(¢(i))
minimizes the true social loss (which we assume to be given by the benchmark values of
¸ = 4 and º = 1), under learning.10 We used a grid search to ¯nd the optimal weights (up
to one decimal place) for the central bank loss. The results are reported in Table 4.
The optimal weights for the central bank loss on unemployment and interest rate vari-
ability are signi¯cantly smaller than the true weights in the social loss and this downward
bias is increasing in the learning rate ·. Thus, in the presence of learning, it is optimal to
assign the central bank a loss that places much greater relative weight on in°ation stabi-
lization than the true social loss, that is, to employ a \conservative" central banker in the
terminology of Rogo® (1985).11 In addition, the relative weight on interest rate variability
is reduced by a greater proportion than that on unemployment variability.
For the case of · = 0:02, the optimal weights are given by ~ ¸ = 1:2 and ~ º = 0:2. The
resulting OC policy is given by:
it = 1:11it¡1 ¡ 0:05it¡2 ¡ 0:20it¡3+ (12)
0:21¼t¡1 + 0:19¼t¡2 + 0:01¼t¡3 ¡ 3:14ut¡1 + 2:34ut¡2 ¡ 0:34ut¡3:
Note that this policy is characterized by a nearly twice as large direct response to the
10Note that this approach can be generalized to allow for including additional variables in the loss function.
We leave this to future research.
11Orphanides and Williams (2005), using a very simple theoretical model, similarly found that a central
bank loss function biased toward stabilizing in°ation (relative to output) was optimal when private agents
learn.
18in°ation rate compared to the OC policy derived for the benchmark loss (and reported in
equation 8), re°ecting the greater relative weight on in°ation stabilization for the biased
central bank loss. This policy also responds somewhat more aggressively to unemployment
and exhibits less intrinsic policy inertia (as measured by the sum of the coe±cients on the
lagged interest rate), re°ecting the smaller weight on interest rate variability. In the case
of · = 0:03, the optimal weights on unemployment and interest rate variability are about
one tenth as large as those in the true social loss; that is, the relative weight on in°ation is
about 10 times as large as the true social loss.
7 Simple Rules
To provide a metric against which to measure the performance of the optimal control poli-
cies, we examine the performance under learning of two alternative monetary policy rules
that have been recommended in the literature for their robustness to various forms of model
uncertainty.
The ¯rst rule is a version of the forecast-based policy rule proposed by Levin, Wieland,
and Williams (2003). We refer to this as the LWW type of policy rule; according to this
rule, the short-term interest rate is determined as follows:
it = it¡1 + µ¼(¹ ¼e
t+3 ¡ ¼¤) + µu(ut¡1 ¡ u¤); (13)
where ¹ ¼e
t+3 is the three-quarter-ahead forecast of the four-quarter change in the price level
and u¤ is the natural rate of unemployment which we take to be constant and known.
The second rule we consider is that proposed by Orphanides and Williams (2007a) for
its robustness properties in the face of natural rate uncertainty; we refer to it as the OW
rule:
it = it¡1 + µ¼(¹ ¼e
t+3 ¡ ¼¤) + µ¢u(ut¡1 ¡ ut¡2): (14)
Note that this policy rule is related to the elastic price standard proposed by Hall (1984),
whereby the central bank aims to maintain a stipulated relationship between the forecast
of the unemployment rate and the price level. This policy rule is also closely related to the
19¯rst di®erence of a modi¯ed Taylor-type policy rule in which the forecast of the price level
is substituted for the forecast of the in°ation rate.12
We chose the parameters of these simple rules to minimize the benchmark loss under the
assumption of rational expectations using a hill-climbing routine.13 The resulting optimized
LWW rule is given by:
it = it¡1 + 1:05 (¹ ¼e
t+3 ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1:39 (ut¡1 ¡ u¤): (15)
The optimized OW rule is given by:
it = it¡1 + 1:74 (¹ ¼e
t+3 ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1:19 (ut¡1 ¡ ut¡2): (16)
In the following, we refer to these speci¯c parameterizations of these two rules simply as
the LWW and OW rules.
The OC policy derived using the true social loss yield a loss only modestly lower than
that associated with the LWW rule, a result consistent with the ¯ndings in Williams (2003)
and Levin and Williams (2003) for other models. The small di®erences in outcomes between
the OC policy and the LWW rule are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the impulse
responses to the two shocks for the OC policy, LWW rule, and the OW rule, under rational
expectations. The impulse responses under the LWW rule mimic very closely those of
the optimal control policy. The only noticeable di®erence is seen in the responses to the
in°ation shock. The LWW rule prescribes a sharper initial rise in the nominal short-term
interest rate and the unemployment rate than the optimal control policy. Despite this, the
OC policy manages to bring in°ation down slightly more quickly owing to e®ects of the
expectation of overshooting of in°ation past the target.
The di®erence between the loss under the optimal control policy and the OW rule is
somewhat larger than for the LWW rule. In response to the in°ation shock, the OW
policy acts aggressively to bring in°ation back to target, at the cost of a larger rise in the
12See Aoki and Nikolov (2004) and Gaspar et al (2007) for evaluations of policies that target or respond
to the price level, rather than the in°ation rate, under uncertainty.
13We focus here on the rules optimized using the true value of the weights in the loss function. The
performance under learning of the LWW and OW rules optimized under rational expectations are relatively
insensitive to the weights in the central bank loss function, so the gains from biasing the central bank's loss
function are correspondingly modest.
20unemployment rate. In response to the unemployment shock, this policy, which fails to take
into account the level of the unemployment rate relative to its target (the natural rate of
unemployment), brings the unemployment rate back to target too slowly, causing in°ation
to fall further below the target.
In contrast to the OC policy, the LWW and OW rules perform very well when agents
learn. The good performance of the LWW rule is seen clearly in the impulse responses to
the shocks shown in Figure 3 for the case of the three-lag VAR and · = 0:02. For both
shocks, the range of responses of in°ation is much narrower than for the optimal control
policy. Thus, the LWW rule consistently brings in°ation back to target quickly following
a shock to in°ation and contains the response of in°ation to the unemployment shock.14
This tighter control of in°ation does not come at a cost of a wider range of unemployment
responses. The range of responses of the unemployment rate to the two shocks is comparable
to those under the OC policy.
As in the case of the LWW rule, the OW rule e®ectively contains the in°ation responses
to the two shocks, as seen in Figure 4 which shows the distribution of IRFs under learning
for the OW policy rule. Indeed, it does even better at controlling in°ation than the LWW
rule, but at a cost of greater variability of the other target variables. As a result, the LWW
performs somewhat better than the OW rule for all learning models that we consider.
Table 5 compares the performance of these rules to that of the OC policy under learning.
As in the case of the OC policy, the central bank losses are generally larger with the simple
rules under learning than they would be absent learning, and the losses with learning are
greatest when agents use the three-lag VAR for forecasting.
The LWW rule outperforms the OC policy for learning rates of 0.01 and above, re°ecting
the much better stabilization of in°ation under the LWW rule. This result holds regardless
of the version of the VAR used for forecasting. The relative performance is seen in Figure 5,
14Ferrero (2007) ¯nds that policy rules that respond aggressively to the public's forecast of in°ation
accelerates the convergence of least squares learning to the rational expectations equilibrium. Although this
result is not directly applicable to our analysis which is based on constant-gain learning, this mechanism may
contribute to our ¯nding of a narrow distribution of impulse responses under both the LWW and OW rules.
The relationship between convergence under least-squares learning and behavior of under constant-gain
learning is a fruitful area of further research.
21which shows the outcomes for values of · between 0 and 0.03 for the OC policy (the thick
solid lines), the OC policy with the optimal biased central bank loss given by equation 12
(the thin solid lines), the LWW rule (the dashed lines), and the OW rule (the dashed-dotted
lines). Under rational expectations, the LWW rule yields slightly higher variability of all
three objective variables than the OC policy. But, because the LWW rule responds more
strongly to in°ation, it keeps in°ation, and thereby in°ation expectations, well contained
when agents learn. It achieves this while allowing somewhat higher variability in the unem-
ployment rate and the change in the interest rate. The results for the OW rule are similar,
and this rule outperforms the OC policy for learning rates of slightly above 0.01 and higher.
The OC policy with the biased central bank loss optimized for · = 0:02 performs worse
than the LWW rule and about the same as the OW rule for the full range of values of
·. Although not shown in the ¯gure, the same is true for the the OC policy with the
biased central bank loss optimized for · = 0:03. Although the biased weights in the loss
function does improve the performance of the OC policy, it still performs no better than a
simple policy rule. Evidently, the extra ¯ne-tuning that the OC policy is able to achieve
under rational expectations is of little value in an environment characterized by imperfect
knowledge.
7.1 Central Bank Forecasts
Up to this point, we have assumed that the central bank that follows the LWW or the
OW policy rule implements the policy using the same forecasts of in°ation that private
agents use in making decisions. In fact, there are several measures of in°ation expectations
from surveys of households and economists and derived from bond yields. At any point in
time, these various measures di®er and policymakers must judge from the set of measures
where in°ation expectations lie. As a result, policymakers' estimates of private in°ation
expectations are contaminated by measurement error.
Given that in°ation forecasts are important state variables for determining in°ation
and unemployment in this model and that the central bank's reading of private in°ation
expectations is subject to mismeasurement, we now evaluate the performance of simple
22rules assuming that the central bank does not use the same forecasting model that private
agents use. Speci¯cally, we examine the outcomes assuming that the central bank bases
its policy decisions on the average of the in°ation forecasts generated by the three VAR
models, with one, two, and three lags. We assume that the central bank uses the same
value of · as private agents. This use of average forecasts allows us to capture the presence
of heterogeneity in public expectations as well as to introduce what could be interpreted
as systematic measurement error emanating from the model's dynamics into the central
bank's forecast. The resulting RMS of the di®erence between the central bank and private
one-quarter-ahead forecasts ranges between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points.
The qualitative results are not sensitive to this change in assumption regarding how the
central bank forecasts in°ation. The results from these experiments are reported in Table 6.
The outcomes under the OC policy are shown for comparison. In fact, in nearly all cases,
the performance of the LWW and OW rules in these circumstances is about as good as, or
better than it is when the central bank uses the same VAR to forecast as private agents.
8 Conclusion
Current techniques for determining optimal control and robust control monetary policies
rely on the assumption that the policymaker possesses a very good reference model, an
assumption that we ¯nd untenable in practice. This paper focuses on one facet of model
misspeci¯cation and uncertainty associated with the formation of expectations. Our main
¯nding is that optimal control policies are not in general robust to this form of model
uncertainty, providing a warning about the potential pitfalls of optimal control policies. We
¯nd that the lack of robustness of optimal control policies can be partially mitigated by
assigning to the central bank an objective that places more weight on in°ation stabilization
relative to unemployment and interest rate stabilization.
We show that simple policy rules that are robust to other types of model uncertainty
are also robust to uncertainty about how expectations are formed. These rules perform
as well or better than optimal control policies derived under rational expectations, even
23after biasing the central bank loss to maximize performance under learning. Until feasible
methods are developed that allow for the derivation of optimal monetary policy under a
realistic range of model uncertainty including models with learning, the alterative approach
of \stress testing" parsimonious policy rules across a wide set of models provides a practical
and productive method of identifying which characteristics of monetary policies are robust
and which are fragile.15 Of course, robustness of any policy cannot be de¯nitively\proved,"
because the policy may perform poorly in an alternative model that has yet be considered.
As Carlson and Doyle (2002) warn: \They are robust, yet fragile, that is, robust to what is
common or anticipated but potentially fragile to what is rare or unanticipated." Recognition
of this suggests a need for continuing research into the robustness properties of all monetary
policy strategies.
15Svensson and Williams (2007) propose a method to compute optimal policy under model uncertainty
using a Markov-switching framework. Computing optimal policies under model uncertainty with this method
is extremely computationally intensive and its application to real-world problems remains infeasible.
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27Table 1
Forecast Accuracy Horse Race: Root-Mean-Squared Forecast Errors
(OC Policy; ¸ = 4;º = 1)
Forecast Model
VAR(3) VAR(2) VAR(1)
· ¼ u i ¼ u i ¼ u i
True Forecasting Model VAR(3)
0.00 1.35 0.30 0.00 1.35 0.30 0.23 1.37 0.35 0.35
0.01 1.38 0.31 0.01 1.38 0.31 0.24 1.41 0.36 0.36
0.02 1.43 0.33 0.09 1.44 0.34 0.26 1.51 0.40 0.40
0.03 1.48 0.35 0.14 1.50 0.36 0.31 1.58 0.43 0.43
True Forecasting Model VAR(2)
0.00 1.35 0.30 0.00 1.35 0.30 0.23 1.36 0.35 0.43
0.01 1.38 0.31 0.01 1.37 0.31 0.24 1.38 0.36 0.44
0.02 1.41 0.32 0.05 1.39 0.32 0.25 1.44 0.38 0.46
0.03 1.45 0.33 0.09 1.42 0.33 0.26 1.49 0.41 0.48
True Forecasting Model VAR(1)
0.00 1.36 0.31 0.00 1.36 0.31 0.26 1.36 0.33 0.44
0.01 1.38 0.30 0.00 1.37 0.30 0.23 1.36 0.33 0.46
0.02 1.41 0.31 0.02 1.39 0.31 0.23 1.37 0.33 0.47
0.03 1.44 0.32 0.05 1.41 0.31 0.24 1.38 0.33 0.47
Notes: The upper third of the table reports the simulated root-mean-squared forecast errors
when the central bank follows the OC policy and private agents use forecasts from a three-
lag VAR. The middle and lower parts of the table report the corresponding results when
decisions in the economy are based on forecasts from a two-lag VAR and one-lag VAR,
respectively.
28Table 2
Performance of OC Policy under Learning (¸ = 4;º = 1)
OC Policy OC-FT Policy
Standard Deviation Loss Standard Deviation Loss
· ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L
VAR(3)
0.00 1.84 0.68 1.20 6.65 1.84 0.68 1.21 6.66
0.01 2.14 0.76 1.32 8.63 2.23 0.76 1.33 9.04
0.02 2.75 0.92 1.57 13.39 2.86 0.92 1.59 14.10
0.03 3.15 1.04 1.79 17.45 3.26 1.04 1.79 18.09
VAR(2)
0.00 1.83 0.68 1.22 6.71 1.83 0.68 1.23 6.74
0.01 2.06 0.74 1.29 8.14 2.10 0.75 1.30 8.32
0.02 2.42 0.86 1.47 10.93 2.43 0.84 1.45 10.84
0.03 2.76 0.97 1.66 14.12 2.81 0.95 1.63 14.13
VAR(1)
0.00 1.94 0.78 1.43 8.27 1.95 0.79 1.44 8.38
0.01 2.15 0.75 1.36 8.75 2.17 0.75 1.35 8.78
0.02 2.46 0.84 1.48 11.06 2.44 0.82 1.44 10.72
0.03 2.70 0.92 1.59 13.21 2.75 0.92 1.59 13.49
Notes: The left side of the table reports outcomes under the OC policy; the right side of
the table reports results under the OC-FT policy. The upper third of the table reports the
outcomes when private agents use forecasts from a three-lag VAR. The middle and lower
parts of the table report the corresponding results when private agents use forecasts from
a two-lag VAR and one-lag VAR, respectively.
29Table 3
Performance of OC Policies with Alternative Loss Functions
Standard Deviation Loss
· ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L
¸ = 4;º = 1
0.00 1.84 0.68 1.20 6.65
0.01 2.14 0.76 1.32 8.63
0.02 2.75 0.92 1.57 13.39
0.03 3.15 1.04 1.79 17.45
¸ = 1;º = 1
0.00 1.83 0.79 1.05 5.06
0.01 2.09 0.89 1.17 6.54
0.02 2.52 1.05 1.38 9.39
0.03 2.92 1.22 1.59 12.56
¸ = 0;º = 1
0.00 1.84 0.86 0.99 4.38
0.01 2.11 0.98 1.12 5.71
0.02 2.52 1.16 1.33 8.11
0.03 2.86 1.33 1.51 10.48
¸ = 1;º = 0:5
0.00 1.75 0.74 1.26 4.41
0.01 1.96 0.82 1.37 5.44
0.02 2.29 0.96 1.57 7.42
0.03 2.62 1.09 1.78 9.64
¸ = 16;º = 1
0.00 1.93 0.53 1.60 10.81
0.01 2.50 0.61 1.75 15.26
0.02 3.21 0.71 1.98 22.26
0.03 3.39 0.76 2.16 25.49
¸ = 16;º = 2
0.00 1.97 0.59 1.32 12.87
0.01 2.59 0.70 1.52 19.13
0.02 3.60 0.85 1.82 31.24
0.03 3.86 0.96 2.05 38.09
Notes: Agents are assumed to use the VAR(3) in forecasting.
30Table 4
Optimal Weights ~ ¸ and ~ º for Central Bank Loss under Learning
(Society's true loss: ¸ = 4, º = 1)
Optimal Standard Deviation True
Loss
· ~ ¸ ~ º ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L
0.00 4.0 1.0 1.84 0.68 1.20 6.65
0.01 2.3 0.4 1.95 0.73 1.51 8.20
0.02 1.2 0.2 2.04 0.83 1.81 10.23
0.03 0.5 0.1 2.03 0.95 2.19 12.54
Notes: The central bank is assumed to follow the OC policy derived from minimizing the
central bank loss given by ~ L = V ar(¼ ¡¼¤)+ ~ ¸V ar(u¡u¤)+ ~ ºV ar(¢(i)): The true loss is
given by L = V ar(¼ ¡ ¼¤) + 4 ¢ V ar(u ¡ u¤) + V ar(¢(i)): Agents are assumed to use the
VAR(3) in forecasting.
31Table 5
Performance of Simple Rules under Learning
OC LWW Rule OW Rule
Loss Standard Deviation Loss Standard Deviation Loss
· L ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L ¼ u ¡ u¤ ¢i L
VAR(3)
0.00 6.65 1.88 0.69 1.24 6.97 1.84 0.73 1.39 7.43
0.01 8.63 1.93 0.80 1.37 8.17 1.90 0.86 1.56 8.97
0.02 13.39 1.99 0.91 1.58 9.78 1.96 0.97 1.75 10.66
0.03 17.76 2.09 1.04 1.78 11.83 2.05 1.09 1.98 12.87
VAR(2)
0.00 6.71 1.88 0.69 1.24 6.97 1.84 0.73 1.39 7.45
0.01 8.14 1.93 0.79 1.35 8.01 1.89 0.82 1.54 8.63
0.02 10.93 1.97 0.89 1.47 9.21 1.94 0.93 1.69 10.08
0.03 14.12 2.04 0.98 1.65 10.75 2.01 1.03 1.88 11.81
VAR(1)
0.00 8.27 1.89 0.73 1.36 7.56 1.84 0.76 1.41 7.66
0.01 8.75 1.87 0.76 1.28 7.46 1.83 0.80 1.49 8.11
0.02 11.06 1.91 0.85 1.42 8.53 1.89 0.91 1.68 9.72
0.03 13.21 1.96 0.95 1.58 9.95 1.97 1.04 1.87 11.68
Notes: The upper third of the table reports the simulated outcomes under the OC, LWW,
and OW rules when private agents and the central bank use forecasts from a three-lag VAR.
The middle and lower parts of the table report the corresponding results when private agents
and the central bank use forecasts from a two-lag VAR and one-lag VAR, respectively.
32Table 6
Central Bank Loss when Central Bank uses Model-Averaged Forecasts
OC LWW OW
Policy Rule Rule
Private forecasting model: VAR(3)
0.00 6.65 7.00 7.33
0.01 8.63 8.14 8.83
0.02 13.39 9.63 10.52
0.03 17.76 11.27 13.03
Private forecasting model: VAR(2)
0.00 6.71 6.95 7.35
0.01 8.14 8.01 8.53
0.02 10.93 9.15 9.81
0.03 14.12 10.54 11.65
Private forecasting model: VAR(1)
0.00 8.27 7.55 7.84
0.01 8.75 7.45 8.08
0.02 11.06 8.55 9.73
0.03 13.21 9.75 11.42
Notes: The upper third of the table reports the simulated outcomes under the OC, LWW,
and OW rules when private agents use forecasts from a three-lag VAR, but the central
bank uses an average of forecasts from the one-, two-, and three-lag VARs. The middle and
lower parts of the table report the corresponding results when private agents use forecasts
from a two-lag VAR and one-lag VAR, respectively, and the central bank uses an average
of forecasts from the one-, two-, and three-lag VARs.
33Figure 1
Optimal Control Policy: Impulse Responses under OC Policy
In°ation Shock Unemployment Shock









































Notes: The left column shows the responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the
in°ation shock; the right column shows those to a a one standard deviation innovation
to the unemployment shock. In each panel, the dotted line plots the impulse responses
under rational expectations. The solid lines show the median responses under learning
· = 0:02; the dashed lines show the 70 percent bands of the responses with learning and
the dashed-dotted lines show the 90 percent bands.
34Figure 2
Impulse Responses under Rational Expectations
In°ation Shock Unemployment Shock












































Notes: The left column plots the impulse responses to a one standard deviation innovation
to the in°ation shock, e¼. The right column plots the impulse responses to a one standard
deviation innovation to the unemployment shock, ev.
35Figure 3
LWW Rule: Impulse Responses with Learning (· = 0:02)
In°ation Shock Unemployment Shock









































Notes: The left column shows the responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the
in°ation shock; the right column shows those to a one standard deviation innovation to the
unemployment shock. Agents use the VAR(3)for forecasting. In each panel, the dotted line
plots the impulse responses under rational expectations. The solid lines show the median
responses under learning. The dashed lines show the 70 percent bands of the responses with
learning; the dashed-dotted lines show the 90 percent bands.
36Figure 4
OW Rule: Impulse Responses with Learning (· = 0:02)
In°ation Shock Unemployment Shock









































Notes: The left column shows the responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the
in°ation shock; the right column shows those to a one standard deviation innovation to the
unemployment shock. Agents use the VAR(3)for forecasting. In each panel, the dotted line
plots the impulse responses under rational expectations. The solid lines show the median
responses under learning. The dashed lines show the 70 percent bands of the responses with
learning; the dashed-dotted lines show the 90 percent bands.
37Figure 5
Robustness to Learning
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Notes: In each panel, each line plots the asymptotic standard deviation or expected loss
that obtains under the speci¯ed monetary policy for alternative learning rates, ·, indicated
on the horizontal axis. The thin solid lines report the outcomes under the OC policy derived
assuming ~ ¸ = 1:2 and ~ º = 0:2. Agents are assumed to use the VAR(3) in forming forecasts.
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